Ajitpaul mangat, Staff | illustration ted barker

The NFL is a copycat league. As soon as a strategy proves successful for an individual team the rest of the league looks to employ it, either directly or in modification, as part of their game plans. The past 20 years has seen two strategies become so ubiquitous and successful that they are still employed today, and have been attempted by almost every team in the league.

West Coast Offence

The West Coast Offence, the older of these strategies, is the philosophy that passing the football can be just as effective and successful as running the football.

The early history of NFL offences was built on a “smash-mouth” philosophy. This style of play was founded on the belief that running plays are less risky, and therefore more likely to be successful. Thus, it makes more sense to first establish the running game, to tighten defences closer to the line of scrimmage (i.e., force the defence to commit extra players, like safeties, to stopping the run) in order to set up the passing game, as receivers will now have more open areas down the field to run into to, and have more favourable match-ups (i.e. single coverage).

Due in large part to a more aerodynamic football and increased specialization of offensive players, coaches began implementing strategies increasingly focused on passing the football in the mid-1960s. The most successful of these strategies was the West Coast Offence created by Bill Walsh; first, as an assistant coach of the Cincinnati Bengals (1968-75), and then as head coach of the San Francisco 49ers (1978-88).

By employing a passing game that focused exclusively on receivers running short routes and quarterbacks who passed the ball quickly out of 3- and 5-step drops, Walsh proved that the pass could be just as effective, and successful as the run, as these short, quick passing plays increased dramatically pass completion percentages and decreased exponentially the chance for interceptions and quarterback sacks. Thus, the pass could be employed to set up the run, as defences would be spread thinner at the line of scrimmage, requiring more players to drop into pass coverage, leaving bigger running holes for running backs.

In order for the West Coast Offence to be successful there are three types of players required: an accurate quarterback, a running back as proficient at catching the football as running with it, and sure-handed receivers who can run effectively after the catch. The Walsh-49ers dynasty of the 1980s had all of these types of players in quarterback Joe Montana, running back Roger Craig, and wide receivers Jerry Rice and John Taylor.

With the success of those Walsh teams, winning four Super Bowls in eight years, the rest of the league took notice. Since then, almost every team in the NFL has used the West Coast Offence. Teams that currently employ it include: the New York Jets, Houston Texans, Seattle Seahawks, San Francisco 49ers, Philadelphia Eagles, and Tennessee Titans.

Zone Blitz Defence

The Zone Blitz Defence, created in large part to combat the West Coast Offence, is the philosophy that the best way to defend offences is to confuse them, by constantly changing the roles of defenders.

A “blitz” is when a defensive player, other than the three or four down lineman, rushes the offensive line to pressure the quarterback into passing before he wants to, or into passing inaccurately. The major drawback of blitzing is that it leaves defenders covering receivers in “man-to-man” situations where they have no help to defend these offensive players. This can lead to big plays for offences if the blitz fails to pressure the quarterback, and he has time to throw accurately to his receiver. With the advent of the West Coast Offence this was becoming increasingly the case.

In order to more effectively blitz the quarterback, Pittsburgh Steelers defensive co-ordinator Dick LeBeau created the Zone Blitz Defence during the early 1990s. This defence led to two key revolutions: applying pressure to the quarterback became easier and defenders were not left in precarious man-to-man situations.

The Zone Blitz Defence allowed for more effective rushing of the quarterback by using all 11 defensive players as rushers at different times of the game. Thus, a cornerback was just as likely to blitz as a defensive lineman. This constant role changing led to the confusion of opposing offences. Offensive lineman could not identify the player they were meant to block, as they did not know which player would be blitzing. As a result, more defenders were able to get through to the quarterback, which disrupted his throws.

Complimenting these blitzes was the dropping back of all other defenders into “zones,” areas of the field they were responsible for covering (i.e., if a receiver came into their zone they were responsible for defending them). Thus, a defensive lineman was just as likely to cover receivers as a cornerback. This zone coverage meant no one player was responsible for exclusively covering a single player “man-on-man” since defenders were only responsible for them if they came into their zone.

To put this all into context, on any given play two defensive lineman, a linebacker, a cornerback, and a safety could be blitzing the quarterback, while the other two defensive lineman, two linebackers, cornerback, and safety dropped back into zone coverage. This was a very effective scheme to combat the West Coast Offence, as once high percentage throws became low percentage, since the quarterback was facing more pressure than usual (leading to more inaccurate throws and sacks), and he could not identify which receiver would be covered by which player (leading to slower passes).

In order for the Zone Blitz Defence to be successful players who are multitalented and versatile are needed, as they are asked to perform a gamut of duties during a game. Resultantly, it is difficult to employ as a base defence since these types of players are rare. Today the Zone Blitz Defence is employed more as a part of another defence than as the base defence.