Left turn
Is the face of Latin American politics changing?
Andrew Lodge Volunteer Staff
is a nightmare for the White House.
In December of last year, the Bolivian people elected Evo Morales as their new president, after having undergone a process of political change over the past number of years which included the popular ouster of two presidents back in 2003.
Morales belongs to the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party, a leftist organization that rejects the neoliberal policies of trade liberalization and privatization. The setting for his victory in Bolivia has been one of increasing public disenchantment and often out-and-out rage towards plans to privatize the natural gas and water sectors, in addition to an overall sense that free-market reforms have not improved living conditions for the majority of the population.
The Bolivian result, while evoking surprise in the North American media, is part of an ongoing process in Latin America that has seen the increasing success and even outright electoral victories of candidates explicitly opposed to neoliberal free-market reform and increasing integration with Washington.
Morales joins a number of other recently elected leaders in the region including Lula da Silva in Brazil, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Tabare Vazquez in Uruguay who have risen to power on an anti-neoliberal platform. Not surprisingly, each, to varying degrees, has expressed goodwill towards Cuba and its longstanding leader Fidel Castro, commonly viewed in the region as the nemesis of the American state.
In addition to those radical examples (for want of a better term), several other countries now have self-described centre-left parties in power, who are nonetheless taking a more cautious approach towards International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies and are more reluctant to appear to be taking cues directly from Washington. More political developments along these lines can be expected, as there are 10 elections scheduled throughout the region in 2006, and in several instances the left is poised to make significant electoral gains.
The new breed of leaders
Morales represents a new breed of Latin American leader, along the lines of Lula and Chavez, who each aggressively promote themselves as one of the people and therefore for the people. Moraless background like Chavez and Lulas is unique in comparison with past presidents in the region, who were more often than not members of the thin upper-crust in a society that is overwhelmingly poverty-stricken. In a country where leaders commonly acquire post-secondary training in the U.S., Morales lacks a formal high school education. And unlike others, he does not have personal, financial or political ties in the U.S.. Furthermore, Morales becomes Bolivias first Indigenous leader, significant because two thirds of Bolivians identify themselves among the Indigenous population, a majority that consistently finds itself substantially marginalized.
This so-called rising leftist tide has not been without sentiments of disappointment among supporters. Lulas 2003 victory in Brazil was loudly proclaimed as the dawn of hope by followers, but Lula has been ineffectual in the eyes of many at delivering the goods. Despite promises to the contrary, involvement with the much-maligned IMF has continued, and while Lulas government argues that changes are being made at a slow, measured and sustainable pace, polls in Latin Americas largest economy suggest that the electorate is becoming fed up. Even though the government announced last week that it would pay off the IMF debt early, thus freeing itself from the Funds direction, it is difficult to know to what degree this will resonate with the public, whose patience may be growing thin.
The reaction in Washington to the Morales victory has fallen along similar lines to the state departments view of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Chavez has been accused of eroding democratic institutions a claim he and his supporters vigorously deny, pointing to election, referenda and poll results over the past seven years and threatening to destabilize the region. There is concern that results in Bolivia will further compound this problem, at least as Washington sees it.
Americas nightmare
Morales also brings an added dimension of concern for Washington. While the war on drugs has been on the backburner since September 11, Morales, with his support base among the cocalero (cocaine farmers) unions and his open and insistent pronouncements regarding the importance of legalized growing, is forcing the U.S. to address the cocaine issue once again. For his part, Morales holds a zero tolerance policy on drug trafficking but supports production of the coca leaf for traditional use (chewing the leaves) and for refinement as a pharmaceutical ingredient.
Washington, meanwhile, remains unwavering in its view that the solution to the North American cocaine epidemic lies in cutting off the problem at its source and has expressed disbelief and outrage at Moraless audacity.
It is not only the cocaine issue that has increased tensions with the Americans. Morales like Chavez has not shied away from antagonizing the U.S. administration; in fact, both men seem to thrive at making their northern continental counterpart froth at the mouth.
Prior to his election victory, Morales stated that he is a nightmare for the White House. Chavez openly calls George W. Bush a terrorist and blasts the U.S. government at every turn, including late last year at a summit in the U.S. itself. During Katrina, Chavez jumped at the chance to expose the pathetic U.S. government response by sending subsidized Venezuelan fuel directly to the poorer segments of the U.S. population. Even more moderate leaders in the region often resort to anti-IMF (and veiled anti-Washington) harangues as a means of amassing political capital. In a region where many feel unjustly exploited by economic policies directed from Washington, such a strategy is more often than not an effective one.
Underlying the war on words, however, is a concern in Washington that a hostile investment climate will grow out of these political developments. Since the advent of the debt crisis (beginning with the Mexican default in 1981), most countries in Latin America adopted Bretton-Woods-type reforms, led by the IMF and the World Bank and driven by Washington policy directives. Over a 20-year period, many governments signed on for greater economic integration. With several notable exceptions, countries turned away from left-leaning political regimens and adopted liberalization policies that favoured reduced state participation in the economy, with hopes that economic growth would trickle down to the masses.
In most cases, with the possible exception of Chile, the only thing that has trickled down has been more poverty. As such, animosity at the grassroots level towards neoliberal policies has increased. This has allowed a resurgence of populist- and leftist-style politics, with the usual infusion of a particular Latin America flavour.
Given the level of popular discontent with the current economic and social situation in most of the region, it is not surprising that renewed emphasis on programs designed to focus greater attention to social justice and less on economic growth has been a rallying cry. However, the degree to which these have been enacted has varied considerably.
In Ecuador, for instance, Luis Gutierrez was elected with a platform that included greater social spending, but as in the case of Brazil, reforms were not introduced with sufficient speed for many in the country. Coupled with widespread corruption charges in Ecuador, popular protest managed to topple the Gutierrez government back in April of 2005. Lulas government on the other hand, with a broad-based, if ineffective, coalition of support, has managed to cling to power at least until the upcoming election.
Latin America has always been a political powder keg, and few regions can boast as politicized a population. But with this politicization also come increased expectations. In Venezuela, Chavez has managed expectations with a combination of sweeping reforms that benefit the majority, charismatic zeal and, of course, access to some of the largest oil reserves in the world, which is arguably his ace in the hole.
Morales will face the same challenge. Bolivians are by and large poor, and his victory was the clear manifestation of popular political will. At the same time, though, he faces opposition from internal elites and, more ominously perhaps, animosity from the behemoth to the north, which has never hesitated to interfere in the region if political developments unfold contrary to its liking.
In any case, considering recent events, and given the political itinerary in Latin America for 2006, Bolivia and the rest of the region will be something to watch for in the upcoming year. Stay tuned.

